It has a history of destabilising govts
Throughout the hijacking of IC-814 in December 1999, the Taliban was guided by ISI handlers, who took charge of the three terrorists released by India. One of them, Omar Sayeed Sheikh, proceeded to kill American journalist Daniel Pearl. Shortly thereafter, with the help of the then ISI chief, Lt-Gen Mahmud Ahmed (later sacked at the instance of the Americans), the Sheikh transferred $100,000 to Mohammed Atta, the leader of the 9/11 hijackers. Masood Azhar, another recipient of Indian generosity during the hijacking, soon met Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar in Kandahar and organised the December 13, 2001, attack on Indian Parliament.
The third released terrorist, Mushtaq Zargar, now arranges cross LoC infiltration from Muzaffarabad. Post-9/11, the Taliban, its Haqqani network affiliates and the Lashkar-e-Taiba have targeted Indian workers and consulates across Afghanistan, culminating in the July 2008 attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul and the subsequent attack on our embassy officials in October 2009. Illusions that the Taliban would be reasonable partners in a dialogue for national reconciliation in Afghanistan have been shattered by revelations of the Mullah Omar-led Quetta Shura’s involvement in the treacherous assassination of former Afghanistan President Burhanuddin Rabbani.
The ISI has a long-standing tradition of destabilising elected governments and meddling in elections within Pakistan. Former ISI chief Lt-Gen Asad Durrani revealed in Pakistan’s Supreme Court that during the 1990 elections the ISI had provided “logistics support” to a right wing alliance, the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), and even obtained funds for the IJI from a Karachi businessman, Younus Hamid. Durrani subsequently revealed during investigations led by Interior Minister Maj-Gen Nasrullah Babar that on the instructions of then Army Chief, General Aslam Beg, a small proportion of funds collected for the 1990 elections was given to politicians like Ghulam Mustafa Khar (uncle of Hina Rabbani Khar), Hafeez Pirzada and Mairaj Khalid.
The bulk of the money collected from businessmen, according to General Durrani, was deposited in the “K Fund”” of the ISI to finance its external operations. Referring to this claim by General Durrani, General Babar noted in his own hand: “This is false. The amount was pocketed by (then Army Chief) Beg.”
Indulging in such activities was not a monopoly of General Durrani, who had subsequently approached Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for approval of the ISI’s involvement in narcotics trading to finance its operations in Punjab and Kashmir. Nawaz later revealed that he had “refused such a plan”, adding: “As a citizen of Pakistan, I was shocked.” Durrani’s predecessor, Lt-Gen Hamid Gul, who fancied himself as a strategic genius, met his waterloo when he tried to dislodge President Najibullah’s forces from Jalalabad just after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. General Gul had no inhibitions in boasting about his affiliation with radical Islamic elements in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Durrani’s successor, Lt-Gen Javed Nasir, a fundamentalist of the Tablighi Jamaat, earned an even more notorious reputation. When the ISI’s involvement in the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts was established and Pakistan faced threats of further American sanctions, Nawaz Sharif was forced to sack Nasir, who has recently been indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague and faces charges of having violated UN sanctions by providing weapons to Muslim elements during the Bosnian civil war.
The names of subsequent ISI chiefs constitute a veritable “Rogues Gallery’’ of the people involved in terrorism. General Ziauddin’s activities have already found mention. His successor Lt-Gen Mahmud, now like Nasir, a bearded activist of the Tablighi Jamaat, had to be sacked by General Musharraf at the behest of the Americans for his close ties with the Taliban and other radical Islamic groups. General Kayani’s tenure as ISI chief saw Osama bin Laden finding haven in Abbottabad. His successor Nadeem Taj, a Musharraf protégé, had the dubious distinction of also being eased out because of his hard line Islamist propensities. It was during Taj’s tenure that the ISI’s links with the 2008 attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul was established.
His successor and the present ISI chief, Lt-Gen Shuja Pasha, commenced his tenure with the 26/11 terrorist strike by the Lashkar-e-Toiba on Mumbai. Lt-General Pasha has been summoned to appear by a US court in a case filed by the families of the victims of 26/11 after the revelations of Dawood Gilani, aka James Headley, about ISI involvement. He is also reported to have met the indicted Lashkar military commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi in jail.
Pakistan’s military, whose current protégé is Imran Khan, has forced the weak Zardari government to launch a tirade against the Americans after an all-party meeting convened by Prime Minister Gilani, a long-time Army favourite. At this meeting, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif pointedly remarked to the military leaders present that there must be a “reason” why the whole world was holding Pakistan responsible for terrorism. Pakhtun leader Mahmood Achakzai remarked: “There will be peace in Afghanistan within a month provided the ISI stops exporting terrorism to that country.” The Awami National Party and the Barelvi Sunni Tehriq have voiced similar sentiments.
It is astonishing that an army that has brought disrepute to the country, never won a war and succeeded in losing half of Pakistan in 1971 still claims to be the “’guardian of Pakistan’s territorial and ideological frontiers”. Given its continuing adventurism in relations with India and Afghanistan and its bluff and bluster in dealings with the US and its allies, the Pakistan Army now seems leading the country further down the road of extremism, violence and economic stagnation. Pakistan’s military is also set to go wrong yet again if it continues to believe that China will back it to the hilt if it proceeds on a collision course with the Americans.
by G. Parthasarathy
Source: Tribune
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